Congressional Government, certain Wilsonian themes struck me with much more force than they did eleven years ago: the balances of power between Congress and the executive in the federal government and between the committees and the parties within the Congress. Those balances were in better repair, I believe --not perfect repair, but better repair --in the 1990s than they are today, and thus I will add those themes to our discussion.
Party Leadership
In reflecting on party leadership --at that point, Democratic leadership --in Congress in 1994, the bruising budget battle of the year before was very much on my mind. I spoke in terms of "responsible party government," not only because of Woodrow Wilson's important (if somewhat idiosyncratic) contribution to that school of thought and my own political science background, but because I was at that moment part of the effort to make unified Democratic control of Congress and the presidency work effectively.
We whipped numerous measures, some of them long-stalled, to passage: Family and Medical Leave, "Motor Voter," national service, a background check for gun purchases, an NIH reauthorization freeing research from ideological constraints, and major crime and deficit reduction initiatives. Yet the budget and crime victories came after long struggles that revealed deep divisions among Democrats, and President Clinton's health care and welfare reform proposals died ingloriously, contributing greatly to the party's negative image going into 1994.
Republicans have run a tighter ship and have generally been rewarded politically, although it may turn out that today's discussion, like the one we had eleven years ago, is being held on the eve of major shifts in party fortunes. In any event, Republicans have taken the consolidation of leadership control in the House and partisan unity in supporting a Republican administration far beyond what we Democrats aspired to, much less achieved. Newt Gingrich took major steps beyond the Democrats' leadershipstrengthening moves of the 1970s and 1980s with regard to the appointment of committee chairs and members and control of committee and House agendas. This did not significantly change under Dennis Hastert, despite his professed desire to return to the "regular order;" the consolidation of leadership control over the past decade has reached levels not seen since the days of Reed and Cannon.
With the accession of George W. Bush, a Republican president determined to govern from the "right-in" rather than the "center-out," GOP control took on a harder edge in terms of tactics designed to eliminate dependence on or participation by A second tactic is to bring bills to the floor under increasingly restrictive rules. The incidence of completely closed rules that preclude the offering of any amendments whatsoever, including the traditional minority substitute, went from 9 percent in the last As a member of the congressional minority on the receiving end of such practices, it will perhaps not surprise you to learn that I have had some second thoughts about responsible party government. But the fact is that those second thoughts began years ago and were refined in the crucible of 1993-94 as well as during Democrats' years in the wilderness. The second thoughts do not bespeak a reversal: I continue to believe in the virtues of party discipline in the House and to try to help achieve it on our side of the aisle. It is basically a good thing that both parties have gained strength and solidarity in the modern House, opening up productive, cooperative roles for individual members, overcoming fragmentation, and enabling the majority to rule. But there are balances to Thirdly, Congress needs a bipartisan as well as a partisan capacity. The sharply partisan approach of President Bush and congressional leaders arguably has decreased rather than increased their ability to handle areas such as trade and energy effectively.
Certainly it bodes poorly for our ability to deal with the major "dedistributive" issues --notably deficit reduction and entitlement reform --that loom over the horizon. 7 Is it remotely conceivable that anything resembling the 1990 bipartisan budget agreement could be concluded in Washington today, even though today's budget crisis is more serious? One problem is that this President Bush, unlike his father, barely acknowledges the problem. But even if he did, the partisan divide is so wide, and the mechanisms of collaboration so atrophied, as to make a 1990-style bipartisan agreement almost unthinkable. Nor does 1993 offer a reliable alternative model. In retrospect, that budget plan, passed with Democratic "heavy lifting" alone, appears even more remarkable than it did at the time. But it was that experience that decisively convinced me that for the major dedistributive issues we face, we must keep the mechanisms of bipartisan communication and cooperation --as well as those of majority-party mobilization --in working order if we are to govern successfully. It is that bipartisan capacity that we have at least temporarily lost in the current era, and it is a dangerous loss.
Committee Decline
Woodrow Wilson portrayed committees as at once dominating the work and the power structure of Congress and exemplifying its defects as a governing institution. In 1994 I offered a contrasting view of the role of committees in offering members incentives to engagement, fostering expertise and deliberation, and facilitating oversight of executive agencies and programs. Today all of those functions are in decline.
Most House committee chairs have considerably less autonomy than their Democratic counterparts had before 1994 --a function of how they are appointed and reappointed, of term limits, and of the leadership's degree of intervention and control. In turn, senior majority positions on most committees have been devalued: there is less for senior members to determine in terms of committee direction; the chairman's frame of reference has likely shifted from his or her committee peers to party leaders; and the authority and resources of subcommittee chairs have been reduced. Senior members on the minority side are less likely to be drawn into collaborative relationships, and they are often under pressures of their own to maintain partisan distinctiveness. Junior members from both parties will rarely be more than bit players, counted on for their votes but not much more.
I make these generalizations knowing quite well that there is considerable diversity in performance and practice among committees, and even on the same committee from one endeavor to another. Let me also emphasize: I am not inclined to idealize the committee-party balance under Democratic leadership. I thought that our party leaders deferred inordinately to senior committee leaders, and I will want to see some changes when we regain the majority. Still, I believe that the decline in committee (and ultimately institutional) capacity under Republican leadership is real. When political scientists get around to what they call "operationalizing" committee decline, they will find abundant evidence overall of a less substantive, sustained, or self-starting legislative role.
Congressional scholars are already decrying the deterioration of congressional deliberation, mainly implicating weakened and subservient committees. They are as a rule the pleas of special pleaders, the arguments of advocates. They have about them none of the searching, critical, illuminating character of the higher order of parliamentary debate, in which men are pitted against each other as equals, and urged to sharp contest and masterful strife by the inspiration of political principle and personal ambition, through the rivalry of parties and the competition of policies. They represent a joust between antagonistic interests, not a contest of principles. They could scarcely either inform or elevate public opinion, even if they were to obtain its heed. 193,195. 10 Ibid., p. 72.
supporting effective lawmaking and oversight. Party leadership strength and committee vitality can be mutually reinforcing, but they are currently locked in something close to a zero-sum relationship. Discussions of leadership strategy and institutional reform, both inside and outside the Congress, should give a high priority to recalibrating this balance and reinvigorating the committee system.
Congressional -Executive Balances
Reflecting eleven years ago on Woodrow Wilson's portrayal of committees as the dominant force in Congress and Congress as the dominant force in the federal establishment --virtually taking "into its own hands all the substantial powers of government" 11 --I did not anticipate that we were in serious danger of moving to the opposite extremes. In fact, in that fleeting period of unified Democratic control, I was interested in tilting the balances toward less committee autonomy and more effective cooperation between Congress and the White House in enacting a Democratic program.
Obviously, the dynamics soon shifted, with the Republican leadership consolidating power within the House and settling in for what proved to be a six-year exercise of checks and balances with President Clinton. That period, bracketed by government shutdowns and a partisan impeachment, displayed more than enough unproductive standoffs and partisan excesses. As messy as it often was, however, it measures up relatively well --in terms of the constitutional balance of power and modulated, sustainable policy outcomes --when compared to the period of unified Republican control that followed.
Consider the budget process, for example, both the positive outcomes realized and the fiscal excesses avoided, during this period of divided government. The 1997 budget 11 Ibid., p. 49; see also pp. 44, 53-54, 69. agreement was less heroic in some respects than single-party plans might have been.
Democrats swallowed more upper-bracket tax cuts than they wanted as part of the package, while Republicans cut Medicare and domestic discretionary spending less deeply and accepted a new health insurance program for children. But the cross-partisan accommodations also mitigated the dedistributive character of the package and increased both its legitimacy in the eyes of the public and its political viability.
The 1997 agreement was not replicated in any of the other five years; the usual pattern was budgetary standoffs and protracted end-of-session interbranch negotiations.
But even this ragged process produced outcomes that, I would argue, were more balanced and responsible than the budget outcomes of the George W. Bush years. Republicans did not get all the tax cuts they wanted; Democrats did not get as much funding as they wanted for domestic priorities; and Clinton maneuvered both into declaring the Social Security portion of the surplus off limits, to be used only for debt reduction. Checks and balances, in other words, insulated budget politics from extreme outcomes. After 2000, that insulation was gone. The budget process that had been designed to promote fiscal balance and to give Congress its own tools for responsible budgeting was instead utilized to render Congress subservient to the Bush agenda, facilitating tax cuts and other policies which took the country over the cliff fiscally in remarkably short order.
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The election of a Republican president was a watershed event in terms of the So it turns out that Congressional Government still stimulates and provokes. That was true amidst the struggles of 1994 and it is true today, when Wilson's determination to get beyond the "literary theory" and to assess how the constitutional balance of powers was actually working has taken on fresh urgency. 16 The parallels to our own time are inexact and the prescriptions not always convincing. But the topics that, with Wilson's help, I have raised here today --hyper-partisanship in running the Congress; the decline of congressional committees and, with them, of a capacity for deliberation; and a decisive shift in power and prerogative toward the executive --are compelling and consequential.
They are worthy subjects for "common counsel," and it is time for our country's political leaders, scholars, and citizens to take heed. 15 For an account of the impact of the House reforms of the 1970s on the performance of oversight, with a focus on Moss and his subcommittee, see David E. Price, "The Impact of Reform: The House Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations," in Leroy N. Rieselbach, ed., Legislative Reform: The Policy Impact (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1978), chap. 11. 16 Wilson, Congressional Government, pp. 31, 53-55.
